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Abstract of
THE U.S. MERCHANT FLEET--PATTERNS FOR THE SEVENTIES
An analysis of recent U.S. maritime legislation in order to
predict the possible effect it may have on our merchant fleet
growth patterns for the seventies.

Major attention is de-

voted to the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 which the Administration and Congress hopes will halt the continuing decline of
the U.S. merchant fleet.

The investigation is limited to

the shipbuilding industry and is concerned primarily with
government incentives, prOVided to both shipbuilders and
shipowners, designed to stimulate new bUilding programs.
This study finds that the U.S. merchant fleet will experience a healthy growth during this decade as a result of new
maritime legislation.

The prospective fleet will depend

heavily upon standardized ship designs and will contain an
ever increasing percentage of large containerized carriers.
The study concludes that the Merchant Marine Act of 1970
will be a giant step toward restoring the nation to the ranks
of a first-rate maritime power.

Recommendations to help pro-

mote more shipbUilding and to prOVide expanded markets include extending construction subsidies to certain ships that
may not initially operate in U.S. ports and creation of a
national marketing program aimed at increasing the U.S.flag share of foreign trade.
ii
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THE U.S.

~lliRCHANT

FLEET--PATTERNS FOR THE SEVENTIES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background.

The story of the gradual decline of the

United St a t e s merchant fleet has been told and retold.
the fleet continues to shrink.

Yet,

The United States has dropped

from a total of 3,696 merchant ships at the close of World
War II to around 900 s h i p s in our privately owned merchant
fleet.

Of the 650 ships involved in foreign trade, some

400 were built during World War II and will probably not
be operating after

1974.

1

Ships flying the American flag

are currently carrying only about s i x percent of U. S. cargo
moving in foreign trade, down from eleven percent a decade
ago.
History has shown that no nation has achieved greatness
nor maintained it without also being a major maritime power.
Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Vice President of Georgetown University
and a recognized authority on maritime matters stated back
in

1934:
• • • History is • • • eloquent in demonstrating
that any nation which takes the easy way of permitting its commerce to be carried by foreign
flag ships--which rents the service and space it
is too lazy or too short sighted to provide--is
embarked on a policy of dependency that has ended
every time with the nation in question becoming
a second-rate power. 2
1

The Problem.

Recently, the Administration and Congress

have examined and initiated new action in an attempt to halt
the continuing decline of the U.S. merchant marine.

The pur-

pose of this study is to conduct an in-depth investigation
of recent U.S. maritime legislation in order to predict the
possible effect it may have on our merchant fleet growth
patterns for the seventies.

Specifically, this legislation

consists of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 (PL 91-469) enacted on 21 October 1970.
The magnitude of problems in the maritime industry today precludes a thorough study of all phases in this paper.
Accordingly, this investigation will be made from the standpoint of the shipbuilding industry and will be concerned
primarily with government incentives, provided to both shipbuilders and shipowners, designed to stimulate new building
programs.

Trade policies, labor relations, flags of con-

venience, military sealift and domestic politics represent
some areas that cannot be considered although they have a
direct bearing on the future of the industry.
Organization of the Study.

In the belief that a knowl-

edge of the past is necessary to an understanding of the
future, Chapter II traces the evolution of past policy and
legislation from the colonial period to the present.
Chapter III examines, in depth, President Nixon's new
maritime program as embodied in the Merchant Marine Act of
1970.

2

Chapter IV describes the prospective fleet of the
seventies and reviews recent developments in the shipbuilding industry.
Chapter V contains conclusions and recommendations.

3
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CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION OF PAST POLICY AND LEGISLATION
Early Hi story.

From the beginning merchant ships have

played an important part in the history of this country.
The American coloni sts were skillful
and shrewd traders.
schooner and the

sailors~

shipbuilders~

They invented new types of

clipper~

sailing ship known before.

s h ip s ~

the

faster and more beautiful than any
1

New England was ill s u i t e d for

agriculture~

and the sea

and trade became the national pursuit of the Colonies.
Yankees

prospered~

and the Colonies grew under the protec-

tion of seventeenth century English navigation laws.
to the American

The

Revolution~

Prior

colonial trade with the British

$18 million a year. 2

West Indies alone amounted to

This

pro sperity began to contribute to growing rivalry with the
Briti sh.

However~

over 30 oppre ssive British laws and acts

in a 120 year period failed to restrain the aggres sive and
pro sperous growth of American s h i Pp i n g .

3

The s h i p b u i l di ng

industry had flouri shed to the point that at the outbreak
of the Revolutionary War over one-third of the s h i ps in the
Briti sh Merchant Fleet had been constructed in colonial shipyards.

4

The merchant ships of the
privateers~were

Colonies~

ha stily fitted as

an active factor in the s t rug g l e for

4

independence.

Though Americans of the colonial period won

success as shipbuilders and seamen, the effect of the Revolution was such that our 900 ships were lost and most of
our overseas carrying trade fell into the hands of British
shipowners.

5

Thus the American merchant fleet had almost

disappeared.
At the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783, the Colonies
still had the shipbuilding capability and the raw materials
for ship construction.

Prompted by freedom from any restric-

tions of foreign trade, they began rebuilding the maritime
industry.

The initial act of the first Congress under the

new Constitution contained a clause allowing a discount of
10 % of the tariff duties on all goods imported in ships
built and owned by American citizens.

6

Other acts, passed

by this same Congress, placed highly discriminating customs
and tonnage duties on foreign flag cargoes from the East and
served to bar alien carriers from American domestic navigation.

This legislation helped create an era that saw the

imports and exports carried in American ships rise from 23 %
7
in 1789 to 90% by 1795.
The years between 1800 and 1840 have been referred to
as lithe most glorious period in American maritime history.

8
II

Congress passed no fewer than fifty tariff or other laws
intended to protect American shipbuilding and shipowning.
American shipping responded to the government encouragement

5

by building a merchant fleet that almost equalled the British
in size and far excelled them in performance.
The "most glorious period tl continued until 1840 when
the commercial shipping boom came to an end.

One of the

contributing factors to the decline was the advent of the
steamship.

American shipowners

the potential of

steamships~

chose~

however~

to ignore

although the S.S. Savannah had

made a successful crossing of the Atlantic in 1819.
Decline of the Merchant Fleet:

1840-1916.

sail was gradually replaced by iron-hulled

Inevitably~

steamships~

and

the American merchant marine slipped into a decline from
which it has never completely recovered except for brief
wartime periods.

9

America initially lost her

lead~

for she

lacked the abundant coal close to the sea and the skilled
iron workers which Great Britain had.

Furthermore~

the time

and money of explorers and investors were being spent in
10
building railroads and opening up the west.
The Civil War seriously damaged the already ailing shipping assets and many vessels were lost or sold abroad.

Over

one half of the American ocean fleet was lost in Civil War
action.

Postwar high prices and taxes hampered efforts toward

revival~

and England took the lead in bUilding iron and steel

hulled vessels powered by steam and using the more efficient
screw propeller in place of paddlewheels.

6

ll

The government attempted to help merchant shipping by
granting contracts for carrying mail or by permitting the
import of shipbuilding materials 1!Vithout tariffs.

Neverthe-

less, at the end of the nineteenth century only one American
trans-Atlantic shipping line was in operation.

12

In the "most glorious period" the U. S. merchant marine
had carried as high as

90%

of the country's foreign trade,

but the percentage ju st prior to World War I had dropped to
a meager eight percent.

This situation became even more

serious as the ships of warring nations were withdrawn from
our service s and the United States was left with goods piled
up at ports.

The resultant catastrophy to American industry

and commerce incited Congress to take remedial action.
Sh i p p i n g Act of

1916.

The Sh i p p i n g Act of

1916 permitted

the government to buy, bUild, lease and operate merchant
s hi p s .

A new government agency, the U. S . Sh i p p i n g Board,

was given the authority to set up a corporation to build
ships.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation built

2,318 ships in

341 emergency shipyards during the period of 1918 to 1922,
but most of them were delivered after the war wa s over. 13
Despite cra sh programs in s h i p construction, the bulk of
American troops and equipment was transported overseas in
foreign bottoms.

In Se p t emb e r

1918, the British alone car14

ried over one million tons of American supplie s.

7

Merchant Marine Acts of 1920-1928.

The new merchant

fleet had been designed hurriedly under emergency

conditions~

and many of the ships were not suited to peacetime use. 1 5
In

1920~

a new Shipping Act was passed which permitted gov-

ernment operation in peacetime of this war-built fleet.

The

Merchant Marine Act of 1928 provided for the sale of this
fleet to commercial interests.

In an effort to thwart

rigorous foreign competition and high operating

costs~

the

Act of 1928 also liberalized. and increased the construction
loan provisions and provided thinly veiled subsidies in the
form of mail contracts.

The Merchant Marine Acts of 1920

and 1928 provided some stimulus to cure the ills of the
maritime industry;
costs~

however~

due primarily to construction

higher wages and fierce

competition~

the U.S. merchant

fleet fell back again to a dangerously low level.
Merchant Marine Act of 1936.

The Merchant Marine Act

of 1936 set up a United States Maritime Commission of five
members and laid out a long-range program of shipbuilding
designed to build 500 new ships in the next ten years.

It

further provided for government construction and operating
16
subsidies to shipping lines.
These subsidies were designed to equal the difference between the cost of building
and operating ships under the American flag.

8

This important Act, sometimes called the "Magna Carta"
of the merchant marine, defined the national policy of the
United St a t e s with regard to the merchant marine in Se c t i on
101 of the Act:
It is necessary for the national defense and development of it s foreign and domestic commerce
that the United St a t e s shall have a merchant
marine (a) sufficient to carry its dome stic waterborne commerce and a s u b s t a n t i a l portion of the
water-borne export and import foreign commerce
of the United States and to provide s h i p p i n g service on all routes essential for maintaining the
flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne
commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a
naval and military auxiliary in time of war or
national emergency, (c) owned and operated under
the United States flag by citizens of the United
States insofar as may be practicable, and (d)
compo sed of the best equipped, safest, and most
s u i t a b l e types of ve ssels, constructed in the
United St a t es and manned with a trained and efficient citi zen personnel.
It is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United St a t e s to foster
the development and encourage the maintenance of
such a merchant marine. 1 7
World War II.

It was most fortunate that prior to the

outbreak of World War II the foundation had been laid for a
gigantic s h i p bu i l d i n g program.

Even before the program wa s

well underway, war broke out in Europe and once again a
tremendous demand for shipping arose.

With the aid of ex-

perienced. shipyard. management and employee s, new sh i p y a r d s
were built and thousands of new worker s were trained.

By ·

concentrating on a simple standard type of ves sel, the Liberty
ship, the yards were able to u s e mass production methods of

9

b Ul'1·
dlng. 18

The bUilding time to complete a new mass pro-

duced Liberty s h i p reached the unbelievable low of forty
day s.

From

of which

1942 to 1945, some 5,59 2 merchant s h i p s were built

2,701 were Liberty ships, 414 were the fa ster Victory

651 were tankers, 417 were standard cargo ships and
19
the remaining 1,409 were military or minor types.
One of

type,

the final blows to the Nazi submarine menace was when the
United St a t e s started producing these ships fa ster than they
could be s u nk .
In February

1942, the War Sh i p p i n g Admini stration was

e stabli shed and took over the direction of all ship operations.

Included in this group were ships taken over from

private operators in both domestic and foreign trade s.
The se ships, coupled with over

5,000 new merchant type

vessels turned out in s l i gh t l y over four years, carried fourfifth s of the supplies for the entire war effort.
Merchant Sh i p Sales Act of

1946.

20

The end of the war

left the United States with an overabundance of ship s and
shipbuilding facilities.

Consequently, the government

s ou g h t to restore the merchant fleet to private control as
quickly as po ssible and al so arrange for the sale of the exce s s war-built ship s.

The Merchant Sh i p Sa l e s Act of

1946

directed the Maritime Commission to dispose o f the surplu s
fleet in a manner that would benefit the U. S. merchant marine.

10

This act also provided for charter of vessels by U.S. citizens, placement of ships into the lIReserve Fleet ll and firm
pricing policies on the sale of vessels.

American shipowners

purchased about 1,300 ships, about 2,000 were placed in the
reserve fleet and the remainder were sold to foreign inter21
ests.
The Korean War.

With the outbreak of the Korean War

the United states once again found the degree of readiness
in the merchant fleet at an unacceptable level.

In early

1950, President Truman's Reorganization Plan 21 abolished
the independent Maritime Commission and shifted its responsibility to a five-member Federal Maritime Board and a Mari22
time Administration within the Department of Commerce.
These new organizations were charged with the same responsibilities contained in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Unfortunately, the Korean War broke out before these new
agencies had organized to cope with the emergency measures
needed to meet sudden heavy demand for shipping.
Since the old War Shipping Board had been dissolved in
1946, Congress hastily created the National Shipping Authority under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Administration to
assume control of all shipping fUnctions in support of the
Korean War.

In June 1950, the commercial fleet numbered

1,251 ships totalling 9.3 million gross tons.
11

By the end

of

1951, the merchant fleet had expanded to 1,955 ships with

an aggregate 15.3 million tons.

23

This buildup was possible

500 ships from the World War

due to the withdrawal of over

II reserve fleet that had not yet become obsolete.
Decline in the Fifties.

Except for the construction of

some 35 fast new "Mariner" type cargo vessels, the Korean
War did not spur much new shipbuilding activity.

Conse-

quently, the situation in U.S. shipyards had reached a
desperate state in

1954, when not a single new oceangoing

dry cargo ship had been ordered for more than one and a
half years.

24

Operating costs, foreign competition and dis-

interest on the part of the American people all contributed
to the decline.

Air, rail, and truck transportation, which

greatly expanded during the previous war, offered reduced
rates and diminished the requirements for ocean shipping.

25

The government again, in the midfifties, recognized the
need to stimulate the maritime industry.
Eisenhower's direction in

Under President

1955, government assistance was

given through subsidies to ships operating in the foreign
trade of the United states.

Additional incentives provided

government insurance on loans obtained from private companies
to aid in vessel construction.

An arrangement was also

agreed upon whereby the government would accept old tanker s
for trade-in credit on the construction of new ships.
12

The

program eventually provided for the construction of 179 new
ships as replacements for

293

subsidy cost of $1.3 billion.

aging vessels at a government
26

Numerous attempts have been made to analyze the rather
lethargic state of shipbuilding in the fifties.

The answer

seems to be that the American operators were still depending
upon the World War II built ships that had been purchased at
modest prices after the end of the war.

While this did in

fact modernize the fleet at that point in time, it also preeluded the building of even newer and more advanced ships
such as were on the ways of many foreign nations.

27

Thus,

the post-Korean War decline was destined to continue into
the sixties.
The Vietnam War.

In the midsixties the United States

was again faced with a challenge to transport men and supplies to a war zone, this time over an 8,000 mile sea route
to Vietnam.

Once again, for the fourth time in this century,

the U.S. merchant marine was unprepared.

Excluding the

Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) ships, the total
U.S. flag privately owned ships consisted of 970 ships, in-

eluding

549

dry cargo, 262 tankers, and

141

other types.

28

Almost half of these ships were pushing 20 years of age.
For the first time the World War II reserve fleet, which
still consisted of some 1,300 ships, was not quick to respond.
13

Approximately 800 of the reserve ships were awaiting scrapping
and the remainder were considered to be too obsolete to be
of use.

Eventually, approximately 170 ships were withdrawn

from the reserve fleet, repaired, and assigned to private
.
29
shipping companles.
In a lecture delivered to the students of the Naval
War College on 9 December 1971, General Gilbert L. Curtis,
Chief of Staff, Military Airlift Command, estimated that
over 95% of all supplies sent to Vietnam have gone by sea30
lift.
Due to the limited U.S. merchant marine assets,
over one-third of these goods had to be chartered out to
foreign flag vessels.
Present Status--1970.

Unlike previous wars, the Vietnam

conflict failed to provide the United States with the inc entive to build a new merchant fleet.

Helen D. Bentley, Chair-

man of the Federal Maritime Commission, summed up the alarming
facts in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College on
12 May 1970:
Over two thirds of our privately owned merchant
ships are pushing 25 years of age, or over. More
than 600 of the 975 privately owned ships under
our flag are heading strai~ht for the shipwreckers.
• . • Of our better than $70 billion in exportimport trade more than $40 billion of ·which is
oceanborne--we carry a bare six percent in ships
of our own flag. 31
Can this trend be reversed?

The Merchant Marine Act of

1970, discussed in depth in the next chapter, is the latest
14

attempt by the Administration and Congress to salvage a
floundering industry (see Appendix, Figures 1, 2).
Summa r y .

This chapter, through a review of pa st major

policies and legislation, has traced the evolution of the
U.S. merchant marine from its colonial beginnings to the
present in the belief that a knowledge of the past is essential to an understanding of future legislation and trends.
Si n c e its birth, the United States has depended upon a
healthy merchant fleet; however, as pointed out this fleet
has often had to resort to "crashlf shipbuilding and acquisition programs to meet the challenge.
From the "most glorious period lf in 1840, the U.S. merchant marine declined steadily.

This decline continued un-

til the outbreak of World War I when emergency measures
were taken to allow the government to buy and build new
ships.

Unfortunately, hundreds of these ships arrived too

late to be of u se in the war.

Decline again set in after

World War I and became the rule until World War II provided
the incentive to build another strong fleet.

These ship s,

built in the forties, are still the backbone of our fleet
today.

Si n c e World War II other seafaring nations have made

tremendous advances in modernizing their merchant fleets,
while the U.S. fleet has dwindled to a few hundred s h i p s .

15

In an effort to smooth out the ebb and flow of shipbUilding the government has enacted into the law the Merchant
Marine Acts (1916, 1920, 1928, 1936).

The continued peace-

time decline of today's fleet indicates that new action is
needed to rebuild a strong and effective merchant marine.

16

CHAPTER III
THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF

1970

Introduction.
The Maritime Industry of the United States
has been permitted to decline to a point at which
the nation's defense and economic welfare are
imperiled. • • • We must set as our goal a sharp
increase of the transport of U.S. trade aboard
American flagships.
The present rate is 5.6 percent; by the mid-seventies, we must see that rate
over 30 percent and the growth accelerating • • • .
I support a building program to accomplish that
objective. l
--Richard M. Nixon -

1968

Merchant ships are indispensable to the economy of a
powerful trading nation like the United States, not only in
war but also in peacetime.

The increased complexity of to-

day's world, both militarily and economically, precludes
the United States from ever again relying upon wartime buildups to revitalize the merchant marine.
Militarily, as the strongest power in the non-Communist
world, the United States has major responsibilities and farflung interests.

This country now has treaty relationships

w.i th, or commitments to the defense of, some

throughout the world.

44 countries

The strategic mobility concept and

the Nixon Doctrine depend heavily upon this nation's ability
to project instantly U.S. forces and materials to any part
of the globe.

Except for the initial contingency, which may

17

be transported by airlift, the U.S. merchant marine will
have to be ready to carry up to 95 percent of the men and
war materials.

Compounding this problem is the fact that

the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF),which has helped
the United States buy time in the past, will have disappeared
as a source of au9mentation in 1978.
Economically U.S.-flag merchant shipping contributes
significantly to the balance of payments and is an important
employer~

taxpayer and customer of U. S. goods.

period of balance of trade

deficits~

In this

a strong merchant

marine takes on even added importance.

The U. S. Commerce

Commission has predicted that by 1980 U. S. exports and imports will reach $90 billion.

This growth in foreign trade

will require a parallel growth in U. S. shipping capacity to
ensure efficient shipment of these goods at reasonable cost.
In early

1969

President Nixon forwarded to the Congress

a new legislative program calling for the construction of
300 new cargo ships suitable for carrying an increased portion of the U.S. export-import trade.

The President's plan

was coupled to a new subsidy program and a substantially
2
increased research and. development program.
The important
features of the new Presidential program were defined in the
text of the Nixon Merchant Fleet Message to Congress on 23
October

1969.
18

The Shipbuilding Industry.

The new shipbuilding pro-

gram is designed to make it possible for shipbuilders to
build more ships while encouraging them to hold down the
cost of each vessel.

Implicit in this program is a sub-

stantially improved system of construction differential subsidies.

These subsidies will allow our shipbuilders to sell

their ships at world market prices for use in U.S. foreign
trade.

The important features of the new subsidy

system~

all of which have subsequently been incorporated into the
Merchant Marine Act of
1.

are as follows:

1970~

Industry will be able to build more ships over the

next ten years, moving from the present subsidy level of
about 10 ships a year to a new level of 30 ships a year.
2.

The percentages of total costs which are subsidized

will be reduced.

The present

55% of a builder's total ex-

penses for a given vessel will be reduced to
year 1971.

45% in fiscal

That percentage should be reduced by two per-

cent in each subsequent year until the maximum subsidy payment is down to

3.

35% of total building expenses.

Construction differential subsidies will be paid

directly to shipbuilders rather than being channeled through
shipowners as is the case under the present system.

A direct

payment system is provided to encourage builders to improve
designs, reduce delays and minimize costs.

19

4.

The multiyear procurement system which is now used

for other government programs will be extended to shipbuilding.

Under this system the government makes a firm commit-

ment to build a given number of ships over a specified and
longer period of time, a practice which will allow the industry to realize important economies of scale and to receive lower subsidies.

5.

The increased level of ship construction will re-

quire a corresponding increase in the level of federally
insured mortgages.

Accordingly, the ceiling on our present

mortgage insurance program will be raised from $1 billion
to $3 billion.

6.

Construction differential subsidies will be extended

to bulk carriers, ships which usually carry ore, grain, or
oil and which are not covered by our present subsidy program.

7.

A commission will be established to review the

status of the American shipbuilding industry, its problems
and its progress toward meeting the challenge set forth.
The commission will report its findings within three years
and recommend any changes in government policy it considers
desirable.
The President concluded his message with the following
statement:

lilt is my hope and expectation that this program

will introduce a new era in the maritime history of America,
an era in which our shipbuilding and ship operating
20

industries take their place once again among the rigorous,
competitive industries of this nation.,,3
Review of the Program.

Legislation to implement the

program went to Congress in December 1969.

Few changes were

sought in the legislature and even those who suggested
changes gave strong support to the legislation in their
testimony.

Significant support came from shipbuilders and

their suppliers, shipowners, ship operators and the Maritime
Trade Unions.

Prominent among this group was the American

Institute of Merchant Shipping whose members control over
six million deadweight tons of commercially owned shipping
under the U.S.-flag.

The U.S. Navy strongly endorsed the

new shipbuilding program since it must depend heavily upon
the U.S. merchant fleet to transport war materials and men.
The bill in its final form was reported out of the special
House-Senate Conference Committee on 30 September 1970 and
was signed into law by President Nixon as the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970 on 21 October 1970.
This new Merchant Marine Act has largely superseded the
controversial and largely ineffective Merchant Marine Act of
1936.

That Act, forged in the years of depression, provided

government help to only a few select individuals and corporations.

The new act opens wide the doors of opportunity to

all Americans who think they could be successful in the ocean
21

shipping business, and who are willing to risk capital to do
so.

4
In it s key provi sion, the bill underwrite s the con struc-

tion of s ome 300 new cargo ship s for the U. S. merchant fleet
over the next ten years.

The government's share of the cost

of the se s h i ps will probably a mou n t to a figure in exce s s of

$3 billion f o r construction-differential s u bS i dy .5

It

should be pointed out here that thi s provision is already
headed for trouble a nd thu s will be s p e c ifi c a l l y a d dre s s ed
in the n e xt chapter along with a prediction as to the
s p e c i f i c mix of the se 300 s h i ps .
Under the n ew program the con struction- di fferenti al
payment s by the g ov e r nme n t are s c h e du l e d to be reduced from
5 5 % o f ves sel construction co st s to 45% in fi scal year
then two perc ent l es s each y ear s o that by

1971,

1976 the total

allowable s u bs idy will be 35% o f construction co st s.

Recent

s t u di e s on con struction and techniques have indic at ed that
thi s i s fea sible i f large or der s for s h i ps a re forthcoming.
Pr odu c t i on of s tanda rdi z ed ship s s h ou l d also h elp achi eve
thi s g oa l .

Pre sident Nixon ha s stated, that if thi s chal-

l enge cannot be met, a Pres i de n t i a l committe e will exa mi n e
the fact s a n d mak e recommendation s r elative to the future
of th e program.

6

One of the most s ign i f i can t a c t i ons of the n ew l aw i s
the way in which the g ov e r nme n t 1s construction sub sidy will
22

be awarded.

Unlike the

1936

Act, where only the berth lines

could apply for subsidy, any shipyard in the United States
or any citizen ship purchaser may make application for construction-differential subsidy.

Whether the yard of the

purchaser is the applicant the subsidy is to be paid directly to the shipyard for the construction or conversion
of vessels for foreign trade. 7

It is believed that direct

subsidy to the yards will give them more incentive to bring
costs down and. promote their own designs for ships.
The mUltiyear contracting method, now practiced by the
Navy, is designed to issue firm commitments to shipyards.
This enables them to have a backlog of orders and plot
future work loads.

Because of these mass production methods

the government gains the benefit of lower unit prices per
ships.

8

This should provide the incentives for shipbuilders

to plan ahead and make the additional capital investment
necessary to upgrade and modernize the shipyards.
Another aid to operators in obtaining new ships has
been the Ship Mortgage Insurance which provides an inducement for private investment capital to channel monies into
ship mortgages at lower interest rates. 9

The government

will guarantee both principal and interest on ship mortgages.
The anticipated increased construction level will necessitate raising the ceiling on the present federal mortgage
program to $3 billion.
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An important incentive not previously discussed should
be injected here, for it provides the greatest inducement
for building new tonnage in U.S. yards.

The new law ex-

tends tax deferments on construction funds to previously
nonsubsidized operators, including vessel operators on the
Great Lakes and those that serve the noncontiguous trade
routes to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Guam.

Towboat,

barge and fishing vessel operators are included among those
eligible to make use of these funds.

Earnings of a shipping

company can be placed in escrow for new ship construction
before income taxes.

That income, if plowed back into the
lO
account, will be tax free.
The funds necessary to support these various programs,
including all subsidy payments, are appropriated each year

by Congress under the authority of Section
chant Marine Act of

1936.

209 of the Mer-

Individual funding arrangements

and subsidy payments are controlled and monitored by the U.S.
Maritime Administration (MARAD).
tions for fiscal year
August

The first year appropria-

1971 amounted to $485.8 million.

In

1971, President Nixon signed legislation authorizing

a record

$507.6 million for the second year's expenditures.

The bulk of this appropriation is earmarked for construction
and operating subsidies while over
for research and development.

11
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$25 million will be used

It is still too early to predict how accessible these
funds will be in the future.

It is safe to assume that

there will always be growing competition from other high
priority domestic programs.

Additionally, as the new fleet

grows, competition for subsidies and cargo will surely arise
from other modes of transportation such as air and rail.
This problem will be alleviated somewhat due to the projected
growth of intermodal transportation systems where goods
travel door-to-door by way of all transportation modes.
Summary.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 seems to be

extremely practical and tuned to the needs of the 1970 's.
The bipartisan nature of support and the ease in which it
cleared both the Senate and House of Representatives are
indicative of the Congressional concern to replace aging
vessels and reorganize existing shipping regulations and
subsidies.

Although this study is primarily concerned with

the shipbuilding industry, it is apparent from the complexity
of the act that the government recognizes that no progress
can be made in rejuvenating the merchant fleet without the
cooperation of the shipbuilders, the shipowners and the maritime labor force.
The initial response has been encouraging;
the act is still only

howeve~

since

18 months old there are, needless to

say, several unanswered questions.

25

Of paramount concern

will be the ability of U.S. operators to show they can increase su b s t a n t i a l l y their share of U.S. foreign trade to
attract the capital they need to build the new ship s.
The next chapter will address growth patterns and provide a profile of the fleet for the s ev en t i e s based on past
hi story and recent development s s i nc e the pas sage of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
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CHAPTER IV
MERCHANT SHIPS FOR THE SEVENTIES
Introduction.

1970

Although the Merchant Marine Act of

is still in its infancy, there has been enough reaction from
the government, shipbuilders and the shipping industry to
project with some degree of accuracy the status of the U.S.
merchant fleet at the end of this decade.

Most officials

are optimistic about the future but admit that a halt to the
decline will no longer occur until the midseventies, as the
first ships probably will not appear until late

1973.

This

chapter will present the ship designs most likely to be required during the seventies, the prospective fleet, and an
analysis of recent developments that may tend to alter some'wh a t the original concepts of the new shipbuilding program.
The Ships.

Si n c e the new program encourages the use of

standard ship designs suitable for mUltiship, multiyear production, Maritime Administration officials announced in June

1969, that a research program would be established to determine the types of ships and the fleet mix that would be required to carry our foreign trade.

From special studies

conducted within MARAD, together with judgments expressed by
commercial trade route analysts, the ship designs most likely
to be required during the seventies have been identified.
Specifically they are:
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1.

A single screw container ship capable of carrying

1,500 to 1,700 twenty-foot equivalent containers at 24 knots.
Capabilities should be available on s p e c i f i c trades to carry
some general cargo.
2.

A large twin screw container ship capable of carry-

ing approximately 2,000 twenty-foot equivalent s at up to 28
to 30 knots.
3.

A general purpose cargo ship of about 15,000 to

20,000 deadweight tons cargo capacity and a speed of 20-24
knots.

4.

A utility cargo ship of from 25,000 to 30,000 cargo

deadweight and a speed of 16 knots capable of carrying dry
bulk cargoes in addition to breakbulk.
teria for this ship is its cost.

An important cri-

It must be inexpensive to

acquire and operate if it is to compete with foreign "Liberty
Ship" replacements.
5.

An Ore/Bulk/Oil carrier of 60,000 to 70,000 cargo

deadweight and a speed of about 16 knots.

This ship should

be offered in a large range of product options from a special
configuration for single products to a more flexible arrangement such as Ore /Bulk/Oil.
6.

A large tanker of approximately 120,000 cargo dead-

weight and a speed of 16 knots suitable also for Ore/Bulk/
Oil option.
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7.

A barge carrier, which is a radical departure from

convention and has yet to be fully evaluated, although several
versions are currently in operation.

The demand for this

ship is presently uncertain as an industry standard, although
it appears to have definite advantages over container ships
1

and general cargo ships in specific trading situations.
The Prospective Fleet.

After d etermining through ini-

tial studies which types of ships would be competitive in
various trade areas carrying the full spectrum of available
commercial cargo, an analysis was required to ascertain the
relative numbers of these ships required within the three
hundred ship program.

To achieve this end, one study con-

tract was awarded to Bath Iron Works Company and another contract with an identical mission was awarded to the Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company.

From these estimates,

Bath and Newport News projected the merchant fleet of 1982.
1 982 Projections of the U.S. Merchant Fleet
Ship Type

Newport News Estimate

Bath Estimate

1.

Container

2.

General Cargo

3.

Utility Cargo

4.

Ore/Bulk/Oil

83

80

5.

Tanker

22

25

6.

Barge Carrier
TOTAL

22

65

173

15
90

---2
300

300

Source: J.A. Higgins and J.J. Garvey, "Merchant Fle ets
for the Seventies, " Naval Engineers Journal, Decemb er 1970,
p. 36.
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According to a study released by Harbridge House, Inc.,
of Boston, a nationally known management consulting and research firm, foreign flag domination of the U.S. trades will
soon be a thing of the past because of U.S.-developed container-ship and barge-carrying systems.

Although it is per-

haps overly optimistic, the study concluded that the American merchant marine of the future has the potential to become the world leader in developing a fast, door to door,
2
international transportation system.
This emphasis on the
new high-technology ships seems to indicate that the Bath
Iron Works!

estimate may be more realistic since it contains

a higher number of both container and barge carrier ships.
By 1976 the study estimates that the United States will have
a modern 424-ship fleet. 3

More conservative estimates pre-

diet a modern fleet of about 500 ships by 1980 with a total
cargo deadweight of 30 million tons as compared with some 15
million tons in 1970.

Before this desired situation can be

realized, however, government and industry must develop a
national marketing program aimed at increasing the U.S.flag share of U.S. foreign trade.
Recent Developments.

4

As of 15 January 1971, MARAD had

counted 13 preliminary applications for construction subsidy
funds involving 33 merchant vessels, of which 28 were OBO
carriers, two tankers and three barge ships.
30

Five shipyards

are a ctively mark eting OBO designs approximat ely 78,000 deadweight tons each.

S

Unfortunat ely, contracts for the con-

struction of only 1 2 ships had be en signed by the end of
1 9 71 , far f ewer than the goal of 30 ships p er y e a r.

~ffi RAD

offi cials now a dmi t t hat the r a te of 30 ships a y ear for th e
next t en years was too much to expe c t , particularly in the
shaky ec on omy of th e past y e ar.

Assistant Comme r c e Se cr e-

tary Andr ew E . Gibson c ommen te d in a r e c ent int ervi ew:

"We

had a ll hoped to be furth er down th e tr ac k than we ar e at
the moment.

But I b elieve most of the start-up probl ems

hav e b e en resolv ed and are b ehind us."

6

MARAD no longer t alks in t erms of bu ild i ng 30 s hips a
ye ar b ut rather "the e qu i va len t of" 30 ships a year sinc e
many op erators now want larg er ships that c a r r y heavier
c a rg oe s a n d mak e a l arger profit.

Cons e qu ently, the old

si z e l i mi t s ( 8 0, 0 0 0 d e adw eight tons ) sug g est ed in the
original studi es hav e alre ady been scrapp ed by t h e Gove r n ment.

The new emp h a s i s will b e on larg er tankers and c a rg o

c o nt a i ne r ships with g r e a te r capac i t y r a ther than on numb ers
o f ships.

This fa ct c o u p le d with the numb er of c on s t r uc t i on

contrac ts let to dat e will undoub t edly mean t hat the 300
ship g oa l will h ave to be r evis ed downward to about 200 n ew
ships by 1 9 8 0.

Usin g the Bat h e st i ma te a s a g u i d e and sp eak-

ing in t erms of e quivalent ships, the tot al d eadweight tonnag e for the n ew 200 ships will not c hange signifi c antly
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from the

15

million tons originally planned if 300 ships

were to be build.
The Government is also reconsidering its ban on subsidized ships picking up foreign cargo in one port abroad
and delivering it to another location abroad.

Currently

such ships must travel back and forth between U.S. and overseas ports. 7

The idea here is to promote construction of

250,000 ton tankers and allow such ships to handle strictly
foreign shipments until U.S. ports are ready to take them.
At present they cannot enter any ports on the East Coast and
only a few on the West Coast.
The most encouraging new shipbuilding development to
date was the announcement in February 1972 that the largest
commercial shipbuilding order ever placed with an American
facility had been approved by MARAD.

The package submitted

by Maritime Dynamics, Inc., a newly formed corporation, provides for the construction of six giant supertankers at
General Dynamics
$350 million.

8

l

Quincy Shipyard at a reported cost of over

These new ships, when constructed, will be

used in U.S. foreign trade.
Summary.

Recent developments have pointed out that

the initial studies done by MARAD on standard ship designs
will have to be slightly revised.

Specifically the new em-

phasis is on larger tankers and cargo containers.
32

General

Dynamics' Quincy Shipyard has already received a contract
to build six supertankers in the 225,000 ton category.
From all indications the fleet mix presented by Bath
Iron Works for 1982 seems to be holding true.

The number

of container ships required during the next ten years is
still uncertain with an estimated range from 22 to 65 ships.
The conditions upon which the final number depends will be
determined by the continued development of container services on all international trade routes to the extent it has
developed on the North Atlantic.

9

Finally, since MARAD now talks in terms of building
"the equivalent of" 30 ships a year, it is apparent that
the initial estimates made by Harbridge House, Inc., and
others will have to be revised downward by about 100 ships
for 1980.

The amount of this nationfs foreign trade carried

in U.S. ships should rise, however, since the new fleet will
consist of large, fast, highly mechanized ships.

Unfor-

tunately, due to the program's slow start, the Administration1s goal of increasing this share to 30% by the midseventies is no longer obtainable.

From all indications it

is still within the realm of reality that this goal can be
attained by 1980.

The U.S. merchant fleet may finally be

on the road to recovery.
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C~P~RV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions.

This study has traced the history and

evolution of past U.S. merchant marine legislation and policy
from its earliest Colonial beginnings to the present.

The

U.S. merchant marine has always served its nation well,

even in the face of its own physical deterioration and the
growing commercial competition from foreign lines.
United States maritime policy in the past has been influenced by reactions to specific threats to the national
security.

Consequently, the United States has not been able

to maintain a strong peacetime fleet.

Only the impetus of

war has encouraged significant changes in maritime policy
and renewed shipbuilding activity.

Crash construction of

merchant ships in wartime can be avoided only by maintaining
a posture of strength in peacetime.
United States maritime policy and legislation have not
produced the results envisioned in the Merchant Marine Act
of

1936.

The construction differential subsidies and other

government aid programs have failed to foster, encourage oY
maintain an adequate and internationally competitive merchant marine.

Illustrative of this fact has been the con-

tinued decline in the amount of this nation's foreign trade
carried in U.S. flagships.
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The Nixon plan to revitalize the U.S. merchant marine,
resoundingly passed by

Congress~

will be a giant step toward

restoring the nation to the ranks of a first-rate maritime
power.

This new legislation is a

it modernizes the ship subsidy

landmark~

system~

not only because

but also because it

expands these benefits to previously nonsubsidized operators.
These and other inducements make the Merchant Marine Act of
1970 the largest package of incentives ever offered to the
maritime industry.
The initial reaction to this new program has been slow
but progressively encouraging.

The goal of building 300

new ships by 1980 is no longer a reality, but the new emphasis on larger ships will permit the construction of lithe
equivalent of" 300 ships with a total cargo deadweight of
15 million tons.

Still

unknown~

of course, is the ability

of U.S. operators to show that they can increase their share
of U.S. foreign trade substantially enough to attract the
capital they need to build the new ships.
The prospective fleet will depend heavily upon standardized ship designs and will contain an ever increasing
percentage of large containerized carriers and bulk tankers
in the 250,000 ton category.

The exact numbers vary con-

siderably, but construction should parallel the development
of port facilities tailored to their needs.
35

Recommendations.

In order to promote more shipbuilding

in American yards and encourage ship operators to seek out
more foreign trade, the Government should reconsider its
ban on subsidized ships picking up foreign cargo in one
port abroad and delivering it to another location abroad.
Lifting this ban would not only promote the construction
of

250~OOO

ton and larger

ships~

but would also place at

the disposal of the U.S. Government a formidable fleet of
U.S.-flag vessels to be used in event of a national emergency.

Although not directly involved in U.S. foreign

trade, these ships will have an important mission of ensuring that our flag not vanish from the harbors around the
globe.
It is further recommended that government and industry
develop a national marketing program aimed at increasing
the U.S.-flag share of foreign trade.
nology ships will help increase this

The new high-techshare~

but a deliberate

coordinated selling program will be needed to guarantee success in seeking new markets.
The Government should maintain a flexible posture with
regard to the construction-differential subsidies.
to reduce the maximum subsidy payment to

The plan

35% by 1976 should

be abandoned if meeting the lower subsidy goal will make it
impossible for shipbuilders to operate at a profit.

36

Finally, although the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 in
its pres ent form has become an impetus to new shipbuilding
activity, it should not be allowed to become inflexible.
The Act should be under constant review by Congress and
MARAD to ensure its success in providing the stimulus so
vital to the maintenance of a viable merchant marine.
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FI GURE 1
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U. S. FOREI GN TRADE CARRIE D I N AME RI CAN FLAG VE SSELS
PERCENT .( VOL. )
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FIGURE 2
U.S. TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE CARRIED BY U.S. FLAG AND FOREIGN FLAG VESSELS
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FIGURE 3
WORLD MERCHANT FLEET GROWTH
(1000 Gross Tons and Over)
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a o n1 y privat ely owned U.S. ships are i ncluded.
Source: U.S. Mari time Admini~tration, Mercha n t F ~ e et s
of t h e World (Was hin g ton: U. S . Gov t . Pr int . Of f ., 1961197 0 ) , n . p .

